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Pro fe.uor of Social Economics,
University of Mtuichester, EnglandISAY 'second thoughts' becauseas an official in the office of the
Minister of Reconstruction I was privileged to assist in the prepa-
ration of the White Paper on Employment Policy which the
British Government published in May 1944. At that time I think
the overwhelming majority of British economists were excited,
and indeed relieved, that the document (supported by all the
political parties in the then Coalition Government) had finally
seen the light of day. Its first words seemed heavy with meaning:
"the Government accept as one of their primary aims and re-
sponsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable level of em-
ployment after the war". Here was the formal and official
acceptance of the Keynesian doctrine. Here was a technique for
preventing mass unemployment that committed no one to any
particular political creed and was applicable under different
forms of social and economic organization. Most economists were
conscious, of course, of the sketchiness of some details of the
policy of the evidence at some points, of compromise with the
errors of the past and, indeed, of thefundamental inconsisten-
cies of some parts of the argument. But the important point
seemed to be that the Government had finally thrown off the
view, expressed in the British Treasury Paper of 1930, that em-
ployment could not be expanded by public policy.
I still feel that the White Paper on Employment Policy is one
of the most important declarations on economic matters ever
made by a British Government. But I must confess the luster of
that document and of its publication day has become somewhat
dimmed. I think there are many reasons for this.
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The present preoccupation of my country is with an extraor.
dinary shortage of labor, with a dearth of investment goods.
with a potentially inflationary position which makes the prob-
lem of unemployment seem remote and of little urgency.
The meaning of the White Paper has been misunderstood in
some quarters. It is believed, for instance, in some circles that
the White Paper implies that employment cannot be main-
tained at the full unless the State intervenes with detailed
plans and programs for regulating the activities of industries
and individual businessesan attitude for which, inmy
opinion, the White Paper provides no support. TheWhite
Paper was concerned with controlling the economic weather,
not in telling each person individually when he shouldput
up his umbrella.
In the White Paper there were some obscurities which,in the
two years that have since elapsed have not been clearedup,
and promises of further action and enquiryon which no
subsequent report has been made to the public.
Great emphasis was laid in the Paperon the danger of
industrial monopoly to a policy of fullemployment. A
promise was made that "the Governmentwill seek power
to inform themselves of the extent and effect ofrestrictive
agreements, and of the activities of combines; andto take
appropriate action to check practices whichmay bring
advantages to sectional producing interestsbut work to
the detriment of thecountry as a whole". So far as the
public is aware, no specialmeasures have been taken to
implement that undertaking.
The obscurities of paragraphs74-8 as to how far the Gov-
ernment should go in deficit financinghave not been
cleared up although here perhapsthe statesman and the
administrator may be wise innot taking hurdles until they
have to be taken. It will beeasier to reach final commit-
ments on the doctrines of functionalfinance of Abba
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Lerner and Michel Polanyi when George Terborgh and
Alvin Hansen have got a little nearer agreement.
c) Further examination was promised of certain advanced
measures for creating employment: such as greater va
riability in taxation levels; the regulation of hire-purchase
transactions, and the placing of Government orders for
consumer goods. No results of this further work have been
published.
it may be unreasonable to expect new ideas to develop and
new commitments to be made with any great speed in plans that
will certainly not need to be put into operation for a year or two.
But, now that I have foresaken an office for a study, the perma-
nent marriage of theory and practice in employment policy seems
to me to present more difficulties than it did at one time and
certainly success calls for further research into many dim and
perplexing corners of the economic and administrative mecha-
nism. These are the subject of this paper.
Before, however, giving my catalogue of problems and of sub-
jects on which I wish we knew more I make two general prelimi-
nary comments about them.
1) 1 think it is to be assumed that British policy and technique
regarding the maintenance of employment will be based on
'the national income approach'. It is in terms of national in-
come that the British administration has learned itseconomics
in the past few years. It is in these terms that we think of our
problems. It is in these terms that we will solve our problems
if they are to be solved. By the 'national income approach'
I mean, of course, the procedure of making the best possible
forecast for a future period of the national income and the
various items of national expenditurethe Government being
prepared to supplement private aggregate demand if aggre-
gate expenditure threatens to beinsufficient to maintain full
employment. I mention this point because it is arguable. for
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reasons I will return to later, that in 'the national income
approach' we are trying to be too clever.1 It may be that it
would be safer, and in fact more truly scientific, if we simply
watched the unemployment index and tried to do the right
things after the event instead of engaging in the task ofcreat-
ing a national balance sheet for a forthcoming period with
every item in that balance sheet a matter of estimate.
2) Most of the problems of the maintenance of employmentI
shall mention arise from the fact that the policy of fullem-
ployment involves the danger of inflation. It is unfortunate
but inevitable that the fattest fish are caughtnearest to the
rapids.
The Problem of the Target
My first problem is the level of unemploymentwe have in mind
when we speak of full employmentor of a high and stable level
of employment. This issue has been brought sharplyto a head
in Great Britain by Sir William Beveridge who,in his recent
book, Full Employment in a Free Society, claimsthat an average
of 3 percent unemployment will give theeconomic system suffi-
cient elbow room to carry out its essential adjustments.Other
writers, with whom I am inagreement, believe that this is an
impossibly high standard of achievementto set ourselves.2 They
point out that, even before 1914, theaverage rate of unernploy-
ment was at least double the Beveridgetarget and much more
than double it between thewars. They point out further that
the conditions of the postwar worldmay tend to raise the mini-
mum of frictional unemployment; the widespreadextension of
the Social Services may reduce incentive,at least at the margin;
1 There are two, very sobering, factsto which it is worth while drawing attention.
The official estimates of the probable peak ofunemployment in the United States
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the aging of the population may discourage mobility; the rising
standard of living and improvement of individual taste may
mean a greaternumber of minor discontinuities in the manufac-
ture of consumergoods; the tendency for capital equipment to
become more specific may multiply the short period dislocations
in the labor market, and so on.
Behind this clash of opinion as to the target lie two other con-
siderations which are much more fundamental. The first is bound
up with whatis meant by an employment plan. The White
Paper clearly envisaged that estimates should be made ofwhat
was likely to happen tonational income and the various items
of national expenditure, assuming that the Governmentpursued
a normalfinancial course; that the deficiency or surplus of na-
tional expenditure should then be dealt with by specific Govern-
ment intervention of one kind oranother but that, at all times,
the Government action should besufficiently tentative and its
weapons sufficiently flexible toenable it to adjust its own activi-
ties if, in fact, its estimates of aggregateprivate expenditure
proved unsound. Clearly the margin of errorin conducting such
a policy is notinconsiderable.3 Sir William Beveridge, with his
associate Nicholas Kaldor, have a differentconception of the
employment plan. Having made their forecastsof private ex-
penditure and having decided upon theappropriate level of
Government expenditure they wouldseek to make the forecast
come true by exercisingcontrols for that purpose over the
economy as a whole. (Ifeel that if the Planners could distinguish
between a rigid plan and a forecast,and more sternly resist the
inevitable temptation to turn a forecastinto a plan, liberty in
the world would be much safer thanit is at the moment.) But
whatever may be said on othergrounds against the Beveridge-
Kaldor approach, it probably reducesthe margin of error in the
3 Is It unreasonable to suggest that the BritishGovernment should have a public
trial of its economic forecasting by publishing nowits estimates of Income and
Expenditure for 1947? A great deal might belearned from the failure or success
of this trial. It would awaken public interestand enable economists to make their
contribution in the improvement of the estimates.
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policy of keeping everybody in a job. In short, the targetwe are
looking for, the safe minimum distance from inflation at which
we can operate is indeterminable. It depends upon how many
controls the people will tolerate, what their choice will be be.
tween degrees of freedom and points in the unemployment
index.
The second doubt I have about the target is more technical.If
we aim at too precise a target, is there not a danger that themar-
gin of error in the statistics collected for the 'nationalincome
approach' may be greater than the 'gap' between incomeand
expenditure we are seeking to fill. I felt during thewar that a
lot of useless, if not positively mischievous, policy decisionswere
made, especially as regards labor allocations andcommodity
stocks, because the policy was worked out to finer limitsthan
was justified by the accuracy of the statistics upon which itwas
based. No engineer would tryto work to thousandths of an inch
if his gauges recorded only to tenths ofan inch; I fear the eco-
nomic statistician, under pressure from thestatesman, is not
always so scrupulous. It is obvious that the dangerof making
economic 'howlers' increases with violentprogression as we ap-
proach the limiting position. Icontent myself with two illustra-
tions. An estimate of the employablepopulation is crucial in
the national income approach. But Ido not think we knowa
great deal about the forces that determine theemployable popu-
lation. If wages increase,more people may be tempted to work;
on the other hand, many workers (particularlymarried women)
may then be inclined to drop out ofemployment altogether.
Experience in my countrysuggests that taxation policymay have
a marked, though not always a predictable,influence upon the
number of people willingto work. Similarly with productivity,
we cannot with safety accept theexperience of the pastas a
secure basis for forecasting. Ourrecent experience in the coal
mining and other industriessuggests that increases inwage rates
and high levels of taxation,or even the form of thetax, can play
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On this matter of the target, therefore, I would draw two
conclusions:
We need to know more about the minimum level ofunciuploy-
nient. I think a detailed statistical examination of pastexperi-
ence of friction in thelabor market, of the effects of wage
changes and taxation upon the supply of labor andproduc.
tivity would amply justify itself.
Meanwhile, we should recognize the crudity of our measuring
instruments and not set too narrow a margin to thecontrol
of expenditure. Nothing is more likely to bring the new eco-
nomic doctrines into disrepute than the disillusionmentthat
may come to thepeople if hopelessly optimistic views are al-
lowed to gain ground concerning the accuracyof control
guaranteed by the new methods.
The IdentificationofStructural Change
If a policy of full employment is to goalong with a policy for a
high standard of living (and the two areby no means synony-
mous), we must take care that the measuresfor keeping peopk
in jobs do not reduce the rate oftechnical progress or the general
flexibility of the economic system bywhich resources flow to the
points of highest return4 Thatimmediately poses a most prickly
problem. How are we, in practice, todistinguish between what
are usually described as'structural' changes in the system and
those changes (cyclical orsporadic) from which recovery can
normally be expected without anyserious modification of the
general economic pattern? Thequestion cannot be avoided. For
in the former case the right policyis to take the medicine boldly,
get the changes carriedthrough quickly. In these circumstances,
the maintenance of totalexpenditure has only a limited part to
play and creates special dangersof inflation. In the second case,
the maintenance of expenditureis the obvious remedy. Can we
put our finger on some groupsof unemployment and say these
4By a high standard of living I mean ashigh as is consistent with the native ability.
the natural rourc, and the capitalequipment of a community.
I
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represent unemployment attributableto permanent changesin demand or intechnique? Could we, forexample1 have forcseen
in 1924 that thecotton industries of Great Britainand the United
States were destinedto show a permanent decline inemployment in the subsequentfifteen years?
It seems tome vital that the economicscientist shouldstrive to provide some objectivebasis for the decisionsto be made in this field by thepolitician and theadministrator. For it ispre- cisely here that thefull powers of vestedinterests, ofeasy going optimism, of politicalescapism will be broughtto bear to justify doing nothingor doing precisely thewrong things. Inan in- dustry confrontedwith real structuralchanges the employerwill be inclinedto argue that ifwages could be reduceda little, all would be well; thewage earner, that if theemployer were Only a little more efficient,all would be well;the statesman,that if both would worka little harder, all wouldbe well. And theup. shot can so easilybe a nonhiquidatingrestriction schemewhich puts off the evil day onlyat the expense of makingit more evil when it arrives.
I suppose thecrucial query here is:can a declining industry,
not a monopoly, beprosperous; can an industrysuffer a relative shrinkage withoutcreating all these formsof social distressin readjustment whichso frequently haveturned men's minds toward worse thanuseless restrictionschemes? I think itis safe to say that inan economy not in fullemployment theanswer is no. But whatis theanswer in aneconomy enjoyinga brisk general demand forlabor? On this,an analogy (dangerousas analogies are) oftenrecurs to me. A mancan grow old and still remain healthy withinthe limits of hisdwindling physicalpowers. Why notan industry?
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difficult the process of readjustment to a given degreeof struc-
tural change?
Would the general buoyancy of demand makebusiness men
readier to exploit technical improvement?Or would the reduc-
tion of cyclical risksmake the risks of innovation loom larger
in the mind of thebusiness man? Would we retard technical de-
velopment if the business manhad rarely, if ever, to face the
problems of depression? Would newindustries spring up less
rapidly if there were never again apool of surplus cheap labor
which, at least for a time, couldbe exploited? Would new ven-
tures be lessfrequently risked if the employer could notrely
upon someflexibility of wages to cover up any mistakes inhis
own calculations?
For any required degreeof structural change would a period
of high and stable employmentmake labor more mobile, be-
cause of theabsence of the fear of unemployment, orwould it
reduce mobility by creatingthe impression that the State can
deal with unemploymentwithout any initiative on the partof
the individual? Wouldfull employments by preventing abusi-
ness or industryfrom meeting its problems bycutting wages
(since it would then lose itslabor quickly) sharpen thepruning
hook of competition and thusspeed up natural economicread-
justment?
I think we mightapproach some of thesequestions more con-
fIdently if we knew moreof what has happened inthe past. We
have had somestatistical and economicanalyses of the pace at
which industries expandbut much less has beendone concerning
the decline ofindustries. In the lightof the experience of in-
dustry in the lasthalf century, can we saythat competition will
bring about industrialreadjustment as quickly asis socially de-
sirable? Or is it true, asis generally believed,that such changes
go on far tooslowly in what isusually described as 'a longdrawn
out agony'? Iwould like to see adetailed analysis of the paceof
industrial change in GreatBritain since 1890and an examination
of the causes. I fancythis would disturb manyexisting concep-
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tions on this subject. I would like to see some comparativestudies
as between countries, of industrial readjustment: forexample
a comparison of the history of the cotton industries in NewLug.
land and Lancashire since 1900 is crying out to be done.I do not
pretend that such long period studies will beeasy. I recogujie
that they would bring the investigator sharplyup against that
heart breaking question: what is an industry? Iam sure we would
find that many industries in the nineteenthcentury changed in
everything but name, thereby destroying thecomparability of
statistics. I agree that it will be difficultto isolate theconsequences
upon structural readjustment of changes in tariffpolicy, ofre-
striction schemes, etc. But complexas are all such difficulties
they are less intractable than those involvedin deciding, before
the event, for the purpose ofa sound full employmentpolicy,
which changes in the economicsystem are permanentstructursi
changes.
The Problem of Foreign Trade
In many ways what I have saidin regardingstructural changes
applies with special forceto our problems of foreigntrade. But
even if consideration be confinedto what may be viewedas
normal oscillations inour foreign commerce thereare awkward
obstacles to surmount inmaintaining fullemployment. Here
my doubts are mainly those whichhave been expressed byothers. In Full Employment ina Free Society Sir WilliamBeveridge
has established that duringthe nineteenthcentury export trade
tended to be the initiatingelement in cyclicalmovements. E. A. C. Robinson has pointedout that between thewars the varia- tions in Britishemployment in theexport trades were probably
greater than the variationsin employmentdue to fluctuations in home investment.
I think it is fairto say that none of therecent British writing on full employment hasfaced upsquarely to this issue. The 'White Paper itselfreally side-steppedit. For itconcerned itself
5&onomfc Journal, April1945.
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with the need for a high average level for British exports not
with an export trade free from serious fluctuations.
The dilemma here has perhaps been sharpened by the return
to power in GreatBritain of a Labour Government. For to those
who are attracted to the idea of a planned economy as theonly
sensible way in which a community can be master of its economic
destiny there is something strangely inconsistent, if not posi-
tively exasperating, in the thought that the home economy must
depend upon the uncontrolled movements of world trade.And
yet I suspect that the vastmajority of people in Great Britain
subscribe to the view that only through much greaterfreedom
in world trade can Britain hope to attain the averagelevel of
exports necessary to prevent adecline in the standard of living.
There may, in fact, be a fundamental choice confronting my
country. How far are weprepared to accept increased fluctua-
tions in exports in order to raisetheir average level? I do not
know how the choice would go if ithad to be made consciously.
There is, as yet, no indication of anydefined policy. But it may
be a straw in the wind that theParliamentary Secretary to the
Board of Trade admitted, when discussingthe taking over by
the Government of the Liverpool CottonMarket, that some
part of our invisible exportswould thereby be sacrificed but, he
continued, "remittances of this kind areessentially speculative,
and therefore, are unreliable".
For the student of theeconomics of full employment, how-
ever, the task is tounderstand more fully the links, in theBritish
economy, between thedomestic and the export market. I suggest
there are serious gaps in ourknowledge of facts and of mecha-
nisms.
1) I know of no adequateexplanation for the fact thatbefore
the war fluctuations in BTitish exportsusually preceded move-
ments in the tradecycle and may therefore havebeen an
initiating cause. I think adetailed analysis is calledfor of
British foreign trade duringthe nineteenth century tode-
12termine whether what Sir William Beveridge has discovered
is a statistical accident or whether there is sufficient generality
in its truth, when individual export commodities and markets
are studied, to make it much more.
Po6twar British export trade is likely to be very different in
constitution from prewar. The drive for enlarged exports,
associated with the inevitable decline of the older staple ex-
ports, inevitably means a greater diversification of the goods
sold abroad. Will this lead to greater stability in our total
export trade from year to year and will it mean that any de-
cline in exports, because it will be more widely spread indus.
trially and geographically, will be more easily offset bya
policy of domestic expansion?
Are there reasons for believing that, if increased collaboration
between the nations results in a considerably expanded vol-
ume of world trade, then, given the probable constitution
of that trade, fluctuations in exports will be smaller than in
the past?
The Problem of Wage Stability
If a policy of full employment ever drifts into the frustrationof
inflation my guess would be that the immediatecause will be
intemperate wage increases. Notso much, perhaps, because
shortages of labor increase the bargainingpower of the Unions
as because, in a period of such shortages, employersare inclined
to lose their heads and force wages to unduly highlevels. The
processes by which wages are moved upare complex but the
experience in Great Britain duringwar suggests that one de.
stabilizing element is this. The employerrecognizes that he must
retain, at all costs, his skilled keypersonnel; without them his
other workers become valueless. Wagesin this group, therefore,
may rise markedly. But if there is a strong traditionamong trade
unions in favor of the retention ofestablished wage differentials
between classes of workers, the sharpincrease in the monopoly
value of key personnel tendsto transmit itself to all classes.The British White Paper on Employment Policy
The White Paper referred to the wages problem in language
which I fear others will regard as a typical illustration of good
old British muddling but the British would probably claim as
an exampleof their sure ifltUlttOfl in practical affairs and their
healthy suspicion of any too rigid application of cut and dried
principles. The White Paper says "Action taken by the Govern-
ment to maintain expenditure will be fruitless unless wages and
prices are kept reasonably stable ...it will be essential that
employers and workers should exercise moderation in wage mat-
ters so that increasedexpenditure provided at the onset of a
depression may go to increase the volume of employment." But
"there must always be room for the adjustment of wages
there must be oppoTtuflity for the removal of anomalies inthe
rate of remuneration of differentgrades and categories of work-
ers ...The principle of stability does mean, however, that
increases in the general level of wage rates must berelated to
increased productivity due to increased efficiency andeffort."
The strict economic logician is sometimes contemptuousof
policy couched in such vague phrases. But in itsdefense I would
remind you that it was in terms of ill-definedcompromise that,
during the war, the British performedsomething akin to an
economic miracle in redistributing their laborswiftly and in
evoking enormously increased exertionswithout any dislocating
rise in general wage rates.
There were, however, special featuresof the war economy that
help to explain this success.
In wartime comprehensiveeconomic control of itself (par-
ticularly rationing and high taxation)weakens the demand
for higher wages. People fairlyrapidly get tired of saving and
of acting as a post boxthrough which their wages are sent
to the Treasury. Butcontrols of this severity cannot be con-
tinued indefinitely if incentiveis to be retained.
During the war the Britishpublic imposed upon themselves
some odd practicesof self-deceptionsuch asthat of watch-
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ing the official cost of living indexand pretending that it
measured changes in the cost of livingwhichsurely cannot
be regarded aspermanent.
) The British Government, by subsidizing foodand other arti.
des very heavily, kept down the cost of livingindex. These
subsidies are clumsy and inequitableand it is already obvious
that they will haveto be reduced gradually.
There are other goodreasons for supposing that thepresent
system of wage adjustment will be hillytested by a policy of full
employment, The White Paper,as 1 mentioned, declared that
"increases in the generallevel of wage ratesmust be related to
increased productivity dueto increased efficiency and effort".
Putting this more bluntly,we may ask: Is there anyway in which
we could guarantee thataverage wage rates would not increase
by more than,say, 1 4 percent per annum,year in and year out?8
On that I have threecomments:
1) The wagesystem is, at least for thepresent, very rigid. For
many years before thewar we were drifting into thegeneral
acceptance of the idea thatwages go up but never down.In the last sevenor eight years, with theprewar armament boom and the war itself,wage rates cannot have beenreduced in
many instances. Itmay be that, in asystem of full employ-
ment, this rigidity willdecline, since workersmay, to an
increasing degree,meet wage reductions bymoving to a new job arid thereforebe disinclinedto fight wage reductionsso
energetically. But that changein attitude willnot occur im-
mediately. Clearly it willbe more difficultto limit to 11/2 percent per annum theupward generalmovement of wage rates, and yet bring aboutthe appropriatedistribution of labor, if some individualrates must goup but no ratesgo down than ifrates can move easily inboth directions.
Of course this'½ percent could be inaeasedif it were possibleto contemplate a r'trihution of i-eturnj betweencapital and labor thatdid nOt disturb thetotal product of industry.
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The British Government has quite firmly rejected thesug-
gestions put forward in some quarters fora 'national wages
policy'. They prefer to leave wage fixingto the traditional
process of bargaining between the two sides in each industry.
But, for better or worse, the Government cannot refrain from
exercising its influence to bring aboutan increase in wage
rates in certain directions. For example, in Britain we are
committed to what is elegandy described as 'a healthy and
well balanced agriculture' and the immediate food problems
of the world reinforce the case for agricultural expansion.
This policy, in effect, makes inevitable the raising of agri-
cultural wages to bring them more into line with wages in
other industries. Or, another example, the present Govern-
ment has committed itself to a measure of 'planning'. Now,
as the President of the Board of Trade said in the House of
Commons on February 27, 1946: "No country in the world,
so far as I know, has yet succeeded in carrying through a
planned economy without compulsion of labour. Our objec-
tive is to carry through a planned economy without com-
pulsion of labour. The general idea is that we should use a
number of controls, in order to guide production into the
necessary channels, according to the plan we have formu-
lated". Clearly one of these controls would be wage adjust-
ment. In our country, therefore, we are likely to have a
'hybrid' system of wage control. The Government will in-
tervene, on occasion, to try to clear a particular labor bottle-
neck by recommending a wage increase. Over the broader
field of industry the established process of collective bargain-
ing will operate with the workers taking, as one of their
guiding principles, the maintenance of the traditional dif-
ferentials within the wage structure. I cannot help but think
that this hybrid system will have a powerful levering effect
on wage levels as a whole.
There is a third factor which, to my mind, is likely to exert




few years. There has for some time been a publiccampaign
for increased production per manhour in British industry.
That has led to a demand for extensive capitalre-equipment.
No one would deny that increased efficiency at this,as indeel
at all times, is much to be wished for. But the campaign has
led to the assumption that increased efficiency andincrease
of production per manhour are thesame thing, i.e., that capj.
tal costs can be ignored. Thereseems to be a popular chain
of reasoning which, so far as I understand it,runs thus. If
we can increase output per head, wages can be raised.The
way to increase output per head is to re-equip industry.If
wages can be raised, employers will be forced tore-equip be-
cause they will seek ways of keeping labor costs down.There-
fore wage increases are positively helpfulin the process of
reconstruction. I think this sort of reasoning is themore likely
to lead to errors in action because the BritishGovernment,
for many reasons, but particularlybecause of theenormous
national debt, is inevitablycommitted to a policy of low in-
terest rates which, whatever its otheradvantages, deprives the
rate of interest of a part of its normal functionof acting as one
of the most important stabilizingprices in the system.
In these matters I think thereis scope for fact findingby the
student.
Whilst there has beenmuch enquiry into thefacts, and the
causes, of changes in the pricestructure, there has been much
less work done,at least in my country,upon changes in the
wage structure. Do the factssupport the view that wagerates
are less flexible than they usedto be? If so, why? Are thecauses
such as are likely to beincreased or decreasedby the success
of a policy of fullemployment?
1 think it would be wellworth while to makea detailed and
comprehensive examination ofthe rationale ofBritish Trade Unions withrespect to wage changes. Nowthat we have offi-
cially accepted the policyof full employmentthe BritishThe British White Paper on Employment Policy
Trade Unions may well be compelled to think hard regard-
ing their future policy. A purely objective analysis of their
past procedure may be a useful starting pointfor their think-
ing.
3) In particulars if in my country we arefor a time to follow the
double aims of full employment and a measure ofplanning1
it seems vital to decide just how far, and howquickly, redistri-
bution of labor can be brought about by wagedifferentials
and here an examination of the past is theonly objective base
from which to judge.
Administrative and Political Factors in aPolicy
of Full Employment
I come finally to a questionthat might seem outside the ambit of
the economist were it notfor the fact, as I believe, that economic
and administrative problems are nowbecoming so inextricably
mixed that it is impossible toisolate the two subjects.
I am not concerned somuch here with the thought that afull
employment policy willdemand of statesmen a high degreeof
courage and skill inbringing the public tounderstand and accept
measures which, in somequarters and at some times,will be
highly unpalatable. For in a'planned' economy (even in an
economy that is'planned' only to maintainfull employment)
where freedom of speechstill remains we can becertain that
the Government will beblamed for everything that goes wrong.
Whenever times are verygood and incipient inflationthreatens,
the precautionary actionsby the Government arebound to throw
some people outof work. Those whosuffer will find ft odd that
the Government shoulddo this when all seems tobe well. But
I assume that statesmenwill be paragons in courageand in power
of exposition.'
7 It Is important to recognizehow much we aredemanding of statesmen in this
respect. Take, for example.British building policy. TheGovernment is energeti-
cally increasing the buildinglabor force up to 11/2million in order to overcome
the 'back-1og in houses asquickly as possible- Butwhen the housing demand is
satisfied, will the Governmentface up to the need for acontraction in the building
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I further assume that these statesmen will be providedwith
the best possible economic advisers who haveaccess to full eco-
nomic information. Let me be evenmore reckless and assume
that these advisers will in fact always be ina position to give
the right advice; i.e., they will always know whatpoint in the
trade cycle we have reached and what additionto national ex-
penditure will be required in the comingyear to maintain em-
ploymeiit at the full.
Given all this, however, there still remainsa more subtle diffi-
culty, essentially a task of administration,that has to be overcome:
the procedure by whichan economic adviser can transmit to his
political chief the peculiar combinationof experience and intui-
tion that constitutesa sound economic forecast and transmit this
delicate fabric of forecastto his Minister in such a way that the
Minister can defend it with his colleagues,with Parliament, and
with the public.
I am convinced that Iam not making a mountain out ofa
molehill here. Businessmen have to make forecasts of this kind
and perhaps they relytoo much on intuition andtoo little on
knowledge. But for the businessman it is sufficient to make the
right guesses andto act with speed. He neednot, in addition,
be fluent enoughto explain why he reachesa particular decision
or to spend time in justifying hisdecision. The fundamental
administrative problem ofa full employment policy is howbest
these essentially businessdecisions can be made bya bureaucratic
organization where reasonsmust be clearly set forth for each
step, where the intangible balancingof pro and con (whichcan
so easily go on within one head) hasnow to go on when several
heads are working togetherand where these heads,if they hap-
pen to conflict, can waste theprecious days when actionis called
industry? Will they not be temptedto choose the alternativeway out of deciding that, in faa, the housing demandis not satisfied and thatthe community needs an even higher standard in houses,schools, town halls,etc.anything, In fact, that will keep the building laborforce busy. Wherever theGovernment inivenes in order to plan the size ofart industry they will surelybe tempted to maintain demand to justify that size.That is to say, theymay interpret effective demand in terms of their own earlier decjsjon.
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for. Now I am not saying that all this cannotbe done. I am the
type of optimistwho declares that so much is bound up with a
successful employment policy that it has got to be done.But I
do think it is the most delicate and elusivetask of administrative
integratiOn any organization has yet beencalled upon to perform.
It might at first sight appear that the economist orthe economic
statistician engaged in a university or anongovernmental re-
search organization can have little to contribute tothe solution
of this problem. I do not agree.It seems to me that by building
up a specificbody of knowledge of the past that may throwlight
on currentquestions he can limit the area of doubt. Buthe also
has an important part to playin the development of concepts
that reduce the complexity ofthe thinking required on certain
- subjects which enablediscussions to be carried on in a simpler
form and hence help to dissolvethe kind of administrative diffi-
culties mentioned above. Let megive two illustrations. The con-
cept of the netreproduction rate has contributedenormously
to an understandingof the complex factors thatdetermine the
future size of the populationand has, therefore, made it more
likely that countries can arrive atpopulation policies command-
ing general respect andcooperation. My second illustrationis
drawn from the field we arediscussing today. In both our coun-
tries the absorption of theidea of national income intogeneral
thinking and the growing rangeand reliability of statistics of
income have already had manyimportant results. First, thepub-
lic understanding of theeconomic system as a whole hasbeen
deepened and a relativelysimple device provided bywhich the
individual can set thenational interest against his ownprivate
interest and thus increasethe possibility of wisepublic decisions
in economic matters.Second, it has made thingseasier for the
statesman. Advice canbe given to him insimpler terms. He can
put forward to thepublic his policy in language moreeasily
comprehended. He can, atneed, justify a policywhich admit-
tedly may have someminor drawbacks, in termsof a definable
and accepted conceptof the general interest.
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This is all to the good. Butwe are not at the end ofthe benej the ingenuity of theeconomic statisticiancan conf-on us i devising simplermeasures of essentially complex
phenomenaand thus opening up theway for that informedpublic participai0
in major economic decisionswhich the appallingintricacy ofthe subject has up tonow precluded.
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